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Previous research has modeled the evolution of either knowledge creation or 
knowledge networks, but not their co-evolution. This work presents an agent-based 
model to cover this gap and challenge the intuition that both phenomena are mutually 
re-enforcing. The model consists on the rules of partner selection and the rules of 
knowledge creation by the agents. Agents in the knowledge network choose their 
partners depending on their previous collaboration history and on their attractiveness. 
Similarly, the amount of knowledge created by each agent depends on his number of 
partners and the knowledge he has created earlier. The simulations of the model show 
a wide variety of scenarios with different policy strategies suitable for each. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The process of knowledge creation has received an increasing interest in the latest 
times. One the one hand, in the policy arena it is recognized that we are moving 
towards a true “knowledge economy”(Powell and Snellman, 2004). In such a case, the 
key economic performance would be the capability to create and diffuse new 
knowledge, should that be at the individual, organizational or regional level (Graf, 
2006).  
On the other hand, knowledge creation and diffusion have received an increasing 
attention from scholars from a broad range of disciplines (De Solla Price, 1965; 
Merton, 1968; Newman, 2001). The social sciences address knowledge as a social 
phenomenon. Knowledge is not created by isolated actions, but embedded in a social 
structure. New knowledge is created as a recombination of already existing knowledge 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Thus, knowledge will be created through the interactions of the 
agents involved (Powell et al., 1996). Those interactions provide the opportunity to 
share and combine their different skills, resources and knowledge (Guimera, 2005).  
Therefore, one cannot address the question of how knowledge is created without 
considering the social network of the agents involved in this creation. A social network 
is a set of people or groups, each of whom has some kind of relation with some of the 
others (Newman, 2001). The relation between the structure of the network and the 
innovative performance of the individuals or organizations involved has been 
thoroughly analyzed (for a broad review, see Ozman, 2009 and Phelps et al., 2012). 
Most studies focus on effect of the ego network structure (the structure of the 
network around one single agent) on the individual performance (Fleming et al., 2007; 
Granovetter, 1973). That is, how the number or the strength of the ties connecting an 
agent to the others affects his/her performance. The results, nonetheless, are not 
consistent throughout the studies. In some cases, the number of collaborations of an 
organization has been found to have a positive impact on its innovative performance, 
as it provides access to more sources of existing knowledge (Ahuja, 2000). In others, 
though, this impact can be negative, as those collaborations may be difficult to 
manage (Littler et al., 1998; Wynstra et al., 2001). Furthermore, some studies suggest 
that the effect might have, in fact, an inverted-U shape (McFadyen et al., 2009): a too 
sparse network does not allow for ideas to flow, but in a too dense network the ideas 
become redundant . 
Given the wide range of possible effects, one might think that the process of 
knowledge creation is different for different sectors, or even that it might not be as 
network-related as theory suggests. The main aim of this paper is to analyze all this 
apparently different processes of knowledge creation in a network as a single process. 
We will create an agent-based model where agents interact and create knowledge. 
The model has two main components. The first one is the rule of partner selection, 
that it to say, the probability that an agent chooses another agent as a collaborator, 
and the other one is the rule of knowledge creation by an agent. Simulations of the 
model are presented to provide a first validation of the model (Fagiolo et al., 2007). 
We will see that changes in the parameters of the model can provide a wide range of 
theoretical scenarios, including the cases above mentioned.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review and 
grounds the structure of the model, presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows different 
simulations of the model for some representative sets of parameters. Finally, Section 5 
discusses the different results. 
 
2. Literature review 
Knowledge networks 
 
Knowledge creation is increasingly an interactive process. In some cases, as 
medical research, cooperation is reported to consistently increase the odds of fruitful 
research  (Grebel, 2012). Even in cases where agents could try to conceal their new 
knowledge from potential competitors, the evidence is that agents interact and 
collaborate in order to create new knowledge (Fleming and Frenken, 2007). The most 
extreme case is interfirm collaboration. In the case of firms, new knowledge is sought 
as a source of competitive advantage (Henard and McFadyen, 2008), so the firms 
would prefer not to share it (Ahuja, 2000). Nonetheless, the fact is that firms 
collaborate actively, not only with suppliers and clients (Araujo and Mendes, 2009), 
but also with actual competitors (Alcacer and Zhao, 2011; Mudambi, 2008), in order to 
create new knowledge. These collaborations allow firms to access needed assets, learn 
new skills, and develop or absorb new technologies (Guimera, 2005).  
The structure of the network does not only affect an agent’s performance but also 
his future behavior (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2010). As Barabási et al., (2002) point 
out, collaboration networks are a “prototype of evolving networks”. Thus, the network 
cannot be considered as fixed and exogenous: links between agents are dynamic, they 
break and form, modifying the characteristics of the agents (Cowan et al., 2007). This 
collaborations are not chosen at random, but usually satisfy specific reasons (Wagner 
and Leydesdorff, 2005).    
The formation of linkages between firms generally depends on their previous 
history (Baum et al., 2010). Usually, firms are more likely to collaborate with previous 
partners because these interactions increase trust and willingness of both parties to 
engage in a risky activity as knowledge creation (Cowan et al., 2006).  
Moreover, a firm’s decision to start new collaborations depends on the 
attractiveness of the potential partner and also on the firm’s own attractiveness for 
those potential partners (Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005). Firms with more experience 
are more likely to find partners (Balland et al., 2012; Powell et al., 1996). 
Knowledge creation 
 
Knowledge creation is an incremental process (Jaffe et al., 2000): no agent can 
create novel knowledge if he has not some background knowledge. Nonetheless, the 
innovative output of individuals, teams and organizations is deeply influenced by the 
structure of the network they are embedded in (Guler and Nerkar, 2012). Nonetheless, 
this relationship is not linear, but shows highly complex micro dynamics (Ahrweiler et 
al., 2011). Degree centrality, or the number of collaborations, can be found to enhance 
firm performance (Bell, 2005). Thus, policies that support networking can improve 
business performance as well as knowledge creation and exploitation (Cooke and 
Wills, 1999), and also improve the performance of a region (Fleming et al., 2007).  
Nonetheless, the effect of the number of collaborations can have many 
moderations. Collaboration with agents of different classes, such as consumers (Araujo 
and Mendes, 2009) or universities (Azagra-Caro et al., 2012), can deliver better results 
than collaboration with likes. Repeated collaboration as a means to increase 
knowledge creation is more effective if the network is sparse than dense (McFadyen et 
al., 2009). Moreover, even though indirect ties (the collaborators of one’s 
collaborators) have a positive effect on performance and knowledge creation, this 
effect is thinner as the number of direct ties or collaborators increases (Ahuja, 2000). 
Nonetheless, we will only consider direct ties because of their more forthright effect 
on knowledge creation, and to avoid to tangle the model unnecessary.  
However, networking is a costly activity (Ozman, 2009). Having many partners 
increases the risk of opportunistic behavior and requires specific capabilities to lead to 
outcomes (Powell, 1998). And, as McFadyen and Cannella (2004) find, “the greater the 
number of different relationships that an individual must maintain, the less the effort 
the individual can put into creation activities”. The effect of direct ties, thus, can be 
found to have an inverted-U shaped effect on the creation of knowledge (Molina-
Morales and Martínez-Fernández, 2009).  
 
3. The model 
 
Let us consider a model where a set of   {     } agents interact over   
periods of time. In each step, they will form a network and create a certain amount of 
knowledge. The network will be represented by its adjacency matrix  , where        
takes the value   if   and   collaborate in step  , and   otherwise. The network in each 
step will be created depending on the network and the knowledge created in previous 
steps. Likewise, the amount of knowledge created in each step will depend on the 
amount of knowledge created in previous steps and the structure of the network.  
Knowledge creation 
 
The amount of knowledge created by agent   at the time  ,       , depends on the 
structure of his ego network and on the stock of knowledge he possesses (Equation 
                               
 
 
∑                        ). On the one hand, the 
more collaborations he has, the more knowledge he produces, which is captured by 
parameter  . Thus,   can be interpreted as the amount of knowledge created in each 
collaboration. On the other hand, collaborations can be costly, and thus a very high 
number of collaborations can hamper the creation of knowledge. This is captured by 
parameter   and the square of the number of collaborations, so small numbers of 
collaborations will have a positive effect, but high numbers will decrease the 
knowledge created. 
Finally, some amount of the knowledge created in previous step will continue to 
create new knowledge. Parameter   measures how much new knowledge is created 
from the stock of knowledge of agent  . The length of the time window is  , the 
number of periods before the knowledge becomes obsolete. 
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Knowledge network 
 
The probability that agent   wants to collaborate with agent   is a linear 
combination of their previous history and the attractiveness of agent   (Equation 
                          ( 
∑   
           
            
      
∑   
            
             
)           ). 
Parameter   measures the weight of the previous history, and must be constrained 
to      . In turn, there are two sources of attractiveness: the knowledge stock and the 
history of collaborations. Parameter   is the weight of the knowledge stock in the 
attractiveness. This function is inspired by the preferential attachment algorithm 
(Albert and Barabási, 2002; Barabási and Albert, 1999). 
Finally, the probability that agents   and   collaborate is that either of them wants 
to collaborate with the other (Equation                           ). In taking 
probabilities we account for the fact that they can be willing to collaborate but may 
not be able to do so for some reason. 
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To follow the structure of the network during the simulations, the main indicator 
will be the average degree, or average number of collaborations per agent. The 
average degree  is a measure of density: the higher the average degree, the higher 
the density of the network. Other network indicators yield to similar conclusions, e.g. 
the average path length or the clustering coefficient (simulations available upon 
request). 
 
4. Results 
 
The model has been simulated for      agents and       time steps. In 
order to provide a visualization of the simulations, the average knowledge created and 
the average degree are drawn for some sets of parameters. The simulations show a 
variety of behavior, grouped as three scenarios depending on the overall slope of the 
charts. If the slopes have the same sign, the coevolution will be said to be parallel, if 
they have not, the coevolution will be opposite. Regardless of the sign, if one of the 
slopes is flat and the other is not, the coevolution will be independent. 
The parallel coevolution: knowledge creation as a collaborative 
process 
 
If knowledge is created through collaborations, the knowledge curve and the 
network curve evolve hand in hand (Figure 1). This kind of scenario is reproduced by 
the model for high values of  . That is, when the creation of knowledge depends highly 
on the number of collaborations, the more an agent collaborates, the more knowledge 
he produces, no matter what the rest of the parameters are. This is, thus, the most 
common scenario of the model. 
 
FIGURE 1: Parallel coevolution, collaboration based.  
Parameter values: τ=1, θ=0.9, α=0.1, γ=0.1, λ=0.9, μ=0.1 
 
The case depicted in Figure 1 is not the only kind of parallel coevolution that can be 
found. When knowledge creation is easy (high of   and low  ) and agents choose their 
partners depending on their attractiveness (low  ), a complete network emerges soon, 
where every agent collaborates with every other agent (Figure 2). In this case, once the 
agents have started collaborating, and thus creating knowledge, the process enters a 
circle until the network is completely dense and all agents create the maximum 
amount of knowledge they can create. 
 
FIGURE 2: Parallel coevolution, complete network.  
Parameter values: τ=1, θ=0.5, α=0.1, γ=0.1 ,λ=0.1, μ=0.1 
 
When having many collaborators is costly (high  ) and the collaborations are done 
with previous partners (high  ), periods of decay can appear (Figure 3). When the 
density of the network starts to go down, the amount of knowledge created will drop 
and the process will be trapped in decay. This can happen after a period of growth thus 
leading to and inverted-U shape (Figure 4). This is most likely to happen if 
collaborations provide with high amounts of new knowledge (higher  ) and the 
attractiveness depends on the number of collaborators (low  ) rather than on the 
amount of knowledge.  
 
FIGURE 3: Parallel coevolution, decay.  
Parameter values: τ=5, θ=0.5, α=0.5, γ=0.5, λ=0.9, μ=0.9 
  
FIGURE 4: Parallel coevolution, inverted-u shape.  
Parameter values: τ=5, θ=0.9, α=0.5, γ=0.5, λ=0.9, μ=0.1 
 
 
Finally, when few knowledge can be produced from the stock (low  ) and 
collaborators are chosen for their attractiveness (low  ), the network and the 
knowledge creation can experience a moment of rapid increase during the first 
training steps, followed by a stabilization around a certain structure  (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Parallel coevolution, flat slope.  
Parameter values: τ=5, θ=0.9, α=0.1, γ=0.1, λ=0.1, μ=0.9 
The independent coevolution: knowledge creation as an 
individual activity 
 
When agents choose their partners depending on their attractiveness (low  ) and 
knowledge is created from the already existing knowledge (high  ), the knowledge 
creation and the network coevolve independently (Figure 6). The network stabilizes, 
and the knowledge created increases at each step.  
 
 
FIGURE 6: Independent coevolution.  
Parameter values: τ=2, θ=0.5, α=0.9, γ=0.1, λ=0.1, μ=0.9 
 
There is also another kind of independent coevolution (Figure 7Figure 9Figure 1). If 
the amount of knowledge created from the stock is higher than the stock (   ), then 
the knowledge curve will grow exponentially. If collaborations are based on 
attractiveness (low  ), the number of collaborators is steady over time, leading to an 
independent coevolution.  
 
 
FIGURE 7: Independent coevolution, exponential growth.  
Parameter values: τ=5, θ=0.1, α=1.1, γ=0.1, λ=0.1, μ=0.9 
 
 
 
 
The opposite coevolution: costly collaboration depending on 
previous history 
 
When knowledge is mainly created from already existing knowledge (high   and 
low  ), having many collaborators is costly (high  ), and agents continue collaborating 
with their previous partners (high  ), the knowledge creation and the network 
coevolve in opposite directions.  
 
FIGURE 8: Opposite coevolution. 
 Parameter values: τ=2, θ=0.1, α=1, γ=0.9, λ=0.9, μ=0.9 
 
As before, there is also another kind of opposite coevolution (Figure 9Figure 1) 
where the knowledge curve will grow exponentially. This is associated with scenarios 
where the amount of knowledge created from the stock is higher than the stock of 
knowledge itself (   ). If collaborations are based on previous collaboration (high  ), 
this effect will be combined with a decrease in the density of the network, leading to 
an opposite coevolution.  
 
 
FIGURE 9: Opposite coevolution, exponential growth.  
Parameter values: τ=5, θ=0.1, α=1.1, γ=0.5, λ=0.9, μ=0.9 
 
 5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper presents a simulation model of the coevolution of knowledge networks 
and knowledge creation.  As knowledge creation is increasingly an interacting process, 
this kind of models is important to increase our understanding of the process. This 
paper suggests that different scenarios of knowledge creation in networks can arise. 
Depending on the importance of collaborations for the creation of knowledge, on the 
cost of these collaborations, and on how the collaborators are chose, the overall 
behavior of the process can change.  
The most intuitive scenario, a positive coevolution of knowledge creation and 
networks, is not the only possible one: in theory, increased knowledge creation can be 
independent of enlarged knowledge networks, or they can be even mutually excluding. 
This has implications for policymaking. When the objective is to enhance the 
creation of knowledge, it is important to make sure which is the scenario we are 
facing. For instance, polices aimed at reducing the cost of collaborations can be fruitful 
in a environment where knowledge is created through collaborations, but they will not 
in cases where new knowledge is mainly created not from collaboration but from the 
individual stock of knowledge. In those cases, a better strategy might be to invest in 
individual equipment. Furthermore, when knowledge is created mainly from 
collaboration, periods of decay in the creation of knowledge can appear if the weight 
of previous collaboration is much higher than the weight of attractiveness new 
potential partners to determine current collaboration. If such was the case, policies 
should aim at reducing the importance on previous collaboration in the selection of 
partners. A legal framework that would increase the willingness to interact with 
unknown partners, or incentives to collaborate with outstanding partners, would help 
changing the framework to a preferable one. 
This paper has several limitations, the first one being that the simulation model 
suggests different lines of action for different cases. Without identifying which case is 
the one faced, it is not possible to choose between those actions. In order to address 
this issue, the model will be empirically validated in future research.  This empirical 
validation will help to identify the most likely parameters of a real knowledge creation 
process and it can lead to a comparison of different knowledge creation processes.  
Furthermore, in a next stage of research it would we desirable to implement policy 
actions. The model would have to be able to incorporate parameter changes through 
time. Then, the possible actions suggested for the different scenarios could be tested 
as simulations, in a secure and costless way.  
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